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A WISTFUL FAREWELL TO PINK BUGG &
QUEEN CAROLINE*
HOD.

Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.

he is looking right now. He always had
Trial lawyers and trial judges have been applying
been a bad man, ever since I have been
the Maryland Rules of Evidence since Friday, July 1,
knowing
him. Badman. Fights with me
1994. One of those rules modified the Rule in Queen
every time he gets in conversation with
Caroline's Case. I applaud that modification. Another
me. Bad man. Of course, he is my
abolished the Rule in Pink Bugg's Case. "The Rule in
neighbor. We are neighbors.
Pink Bugg's Case?" you ask. Yes, dear reader, there
was such a rule.
The evidentiary issue was generated by the
On October 19, 1964, Pink Bugg was one of the
following
cross-examination ofBugg's neighbor:
Cecil County taxicab drivers lined up at the Whistle Stop
bus station in Perryville, awaiting the arrival of sailors
Q. (BY APPELLEES' COUNSEL)
returning to the Naval Training Station at Bainbridge.
What is Mr. B ugg' s reputati on for good
Although he was well back in the line when the first bus
order,
sobriety, peacefulness, and genarrived, Bugg (in the words of another driver) "shot up,
eral reputation in the neighborhood
cut everybody off, loaded up a full load and went off to
where
he lives? Is it good or bad?
Bainbridge." He then raced back to the Whistle Stop
and was now "first in line for the next bus." As the Court
MR. BUGG: I object to that.
of Appeals noted, because his actions were "contrary to
the prevailing custom," it was "no surprise that [several
A. Itisbad. Badasanybodylhavemet
other drivers] took a rather dim view of Bugg's consince I have been in the world, and I will
duct."
soon be 70 years old, December 27th.
Just how dim a view they took was the subject of
a civil action for assault that Bugg filed against three of
THE COURT: I overrule the objecthe drivers. Representing himself in ajury trial, Bugg
tion.
sought to establish the difference between what he
looked like before the incident and what he looked like
A. He is the baddest man I ever met.
after the dust had settled. He called a neighbor to testify
aboutthe dramatic change in his physical condition. This
The trial judge entered a judgment against
strategy did not succeed. The following transpired
Bugg
at
the conclusion of his case-in-chief. The Court
during the neighbor's direct examination:
of Appeals affirmed that ruling as to defendant Brown
(who had been home in bed on the evening in question),
Q. (BY THE COURT) You say [that
but
reversed as to the other defendant-appellees. Bugg
you saw] nothing unusual about his face
v. Brown, 251 Md. 99,246A.2d235 (1968). This case,
or his head or anything?
however, was as important as it was amusing, because
it established thatthere are civil cases in which a party's
A. He looked that night just about like
26.3 / U. Bait. L.F. - 27

character for a relevant character trait is admissible
circumstantial evidence of how he or she acted on the
occasion at issue. As a general rule, the character of a
party is not admissible in a civil case unless: (1) the
nature of the proceedings, e.g., a defamation action,
puts a party's reputation in issue; or (2) the party's
character for veracity comes under attack during his or
her testimony. Bugg, 251 Md. at 106,246 A.2d at 239.
Under the Rule in Pink Bugg's Case, however, in civil
actions for assault and battery--when the trier of fact
must determine who was the initial aggressor--each
party has the right to prove that the adverse party has a
bad character for "turbulence." Id.
That rule has been trumped by Rule 5-404(a)(1).
Character testimony is no longer admissible as circumstantial evidence of how a party to a civil case probably
acted on a particular occasion. Criminal defendants
have a right to establish their good character for a trait
that is pertinent to the crime. Md. Rule 5-404(a)(I)(A).
Persons who are sued for assault, or for conduct that
involves fraud, should have this right as well.
That the Rule in Pink Bugg's Case has been
abolished, however, is no reason to complain about the
overall excellence of our new rules. These rules are
working very well because many lawyers and judges
worked very hard to accomplish the purpose set out in
Rule 5-102. It would take all the space I have been
allocated to identify each contributor. Two persons,
however, deserve special commendation: Hon. Alan M.
Wilner, Chair of the Rules Committee, and Professor
Lynn McLain ofthe University of Baltimore School of
Law.
Now, back to the major changes.

Caroline's Rule has been diminished somewhat by the
adoption ofRule 5-802.1. Under this rule, derived from
Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993),
when a witness is on the stand, his or her prior inconsistent written (or recorded) statement (or statement made
under oath) is admissible as substantive evidence.
Counsel now have less difficulty dealing with the shifty
turncoat witness who has given a prior inconsistent
written statement.
Rule 5-616, which has no federal counterpart, is
a very useful guide for trial lawyers and trial judges. It
distinguishes "intrinsic" impeachment (in which the
witness is asked about the impeaching fact) from "extrinsic" impeachment (in which proofofthe impeaching
fact comes from a source other than the witness sought
to be impeached). It identifies those modes of impeachment that: (1) can only be pursued by questioning the
witness, e.g., "prior bad acts;" (2) must be initially
pursued by questioning the witness, e.g., "prior inconsistent statements;" and (3) may be pursued without
questioning the witness, e.g., "bias." Under Rule 5616(b)(4), for example, extrinsic evidence offered to
impeach a witness's "impaired ability" (to observe,
recall, describe, etc.) is not admissible unless counsel
questioned the witness on that point--or unless the
judge is persuaded that "the interests ofjustice" would
be best served by admitting the evidence despite the
absence ofthe required foundation. This Rule also gives
the judge discretion to admit: (1) impeachment evidence that is "collateral" (i.e., the evidence is relevant
to no issue other than the issue of whether the witness
gave an untruthful answer to a particular question); and
(2) "collateral" rehabilitation evidence as well.
Rule 5-608 requires that the trial judge sustain
a timely objection to "specific instances" impeachment
IMPEACHMENT
unless, outside the hearing ofthe jury, counsel seeking
Under the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, the to introduce such evidence establishes a "reasonable
lawyer who sought to impeach a non-party witness with factual basis" to believe that the incident(s) occurred.
a prior inconsistent written statement was prohibited
from asking any questions about that statement until the CHARACTER
witness--while on the stand--was given an opportunity
When character is an essential element of the
to read it. This rule was based on the questionable
assumption that witnesses will abide by the oath to claim or the defense, a character witness can testify
testify truthfully. All too often, of course, it impaired during direct examination about specific instances that
form the basis of his or her personal opinion. On the
counsel's ability to expose a deceitful witness.
Rule 5-613(a) strikes an ideal balance. The other hand, when character testimony is being offered
witness must ultimately be given an opportunity to as circumstantial evidence, Rule 5-405 restricts specific
examine the statement, but not before answering ques- instance testimony to cross-examination. That restrictions about it. The significance ofthe change to Queen tion overrules the holding in Hemingway v. State, 76

Md. App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988).
SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
Rule 5-407 excludes evidence of remedial measures undertaken subsequent to the plaintiff s inj ury. As
a practical matter, proof of such measures will now be
admitted only if the defendant is foolish enough to open
the door by defending the claim on the theory that "there
was nothing else we could have done."
EXPERTS
Case law required that an expert state the basis
of his or her opinion before the opinion could be
expressed. Rule 5-705 abolishes that requirement
"(u)nless the court requires otherwise."
Rule 5-706 provides for "court appointed experts."
HEARSAY
A person's non-asserti ve conduct is now treated
as circumstantial evidence of his or her state of mind.
While an "implied assertion" may well be excluded
under some other rule, it will no longer be excluded
under the rule against hearsay.
Unlike the federal rules (that place an artificial
"non-hearsay" label on certain out-of-court declarations that are classic hearsay exceptions), our rules
divide hearsay exceptions into three categories: (1) Rule
5-802.1 contains those exceptions that apply only when
the witness who testifies at trial is the person who made
the out-of-court declaration; (2) Rule 5-804 contains
those exceptions that apply only when the out-of-court
declarant is "unavailable" to testify; and (3) Rule 5-803
contains the exceptions that apply regardless ofwhether
the out-of-court declarant is available to testify. The
new rilles combine the best of the federal rules and our
prior case law.
When a writing qualifies as "past recollection
recorded," it will now be read to the jury but it will not
get into the jury room. A document now becomes
"ancient" after twenty years. The "excited utterance"
exception applies only to statements about the exciting
event, rather than to any statement triggered by the
exci ting event. A statement of intent to do something in
the future is admissible to prove only the conduct of the
declarant, rather than the conduct of the declarant and

any other persons mentioned in the declaration. Learned
treatises are no longer admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment. "Dying declarations" are now
admissible in civil cases as well as in prosecutions for
offenses other than murder. The "prompt complaint"
of a rape now applies to all sexual assaults. Everyone
should be happy with the user-friendly exceptions for
various kinds of records.
The admissibility of "hearsay within hearsay"
(e.g., a party's admission of negligence in the police
report) is controlled by Rule 5-805, while the impeachment (and rehabilitation) of hearsay declarants is controlled by Rule 5-806.
AUTHENTICATION
A business record may now be authenticated
through a certificate that complies with Rule 5-902,
rather than through a "live" witness, provided that the
lawyer who wishes to use this procedure complies with
the notice requirement of Rule 5-902(a)(1l). The
absence ofan entry in a public record can also be proven
by such a certificate, but it appears that testimony will
still be required to prove the absence of an entry in a
business record. Under Rule 5-902(a)(12), the court
can require that any authentication objection be made
before the trial begins.
ODDS AND ENDS
We now have a rule of "immediate completeness" for all written, recorded, and transcribed statements. Rule 5-1 06 extends to all such items the rule of
completeness provided for depositions by Rule 2419(b).
Rule 5-201 resolved any disagreement on the
issue ofwhether counsel could introduce evidence that
controverted a fact about which the court took judicial
notice. The introduction of such evidence is prohibited
by that rule.
Rule 5-1004 provides for the introduction of
"secondary" evidence when the absence ofthe original
document has been excused. Case law required that
counsel use the "best (i.e., most accurate, probative,
reliable, satisfactory) secondary" evidence in such a
situation. That requirement does not appear i~ the new
rule.
Offers of compromise, payment of medical
expenses, and statements made during plea negotia26.3 / U. Bait. L.F. - 29

tions all enjoy more protection under the new rules. We
now have "State's agent" and child's "support person"
exceptions to the "sequestration" rule. Lawyers representing criminal defendants must be aware ofthe potential dangers lurking in Rules 5-41 O(b)(1),5-41 O(c), and
5-611 (b )(2).

JURY INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT
PRESUMPTIONS
Rule 5-301 (a) provides for the method by whi ch
the judge presiding over a civil trial decides whether the
evidence offered to rebut a presumption: (1) is so
conclusive that the presUJ;nption has been rebutted as a
matter of law; (2) is so weak that the presumed fact
stands established as a matter of law; or (3) has generated a genuine issue of controverted fact that must be
resolved by the trier offact. According to the Committee
Note, this rule was intended to codify the approach to
presumptions taken by the Court of Appeals in Grier v.
Rosenberg, 213 Md. 248,131 A.2d 737 (1957). Does
this rule require a change in jury instructions? In the
humble opinion of your author, the answer is "no,"
unless the Rule actually trumps the holding in Grier. Let
us examine the facts of that case.
On January 5, 1953,ataboutl :30P.M., Maurice
Flather was driving a Baltimore Transit Compnay "trackless trolley" on the "21 line" in Baltimore City. The bus
was proceeding in a northerly direction on Caroline
Street, and stopped to pick up passengers at the southeast corner of Caroline and Monument Streets. Miss
Mable Grier was the last passenger to board at that stop,
and she was about to pay her fare when the traffic light
changed to green for northbound traffic.
As the bus began to enter the intersection, a blue
car that had been positioned to its left made (in Flather' s
words) "a sharp right hand turn in front of [the bus and]
went east on Monument Street." Flather slammed on
the breaks. As a result of the unusual stop, Miss Grier
was thrown against the windshield of the bus and her
head struck the rear view mirror. She ultimately sued (1)
the Baltimore Transit Company; (2) Mr. Flather; and (3)
Harry Rosenberg, the alleged owner of the blue car.
A Baltimore City Court jury heard Mr. Flather
testify that 72-751 was the license number ofthe blue car
that caused the sudden stop, and heard the ChiefInvestigator of the Department of Motor Vehicles testify that
this license number had been issued for an automobile
owned by Mr. Rosenberg. The jurors also heard from

Mr. Rosenberg, and ultimately returned a verdict in
favor of each defendant.
In a Memorandum Opinion explaining why he
was denying Miss Grier's motion for a new trial, the
trial judge provided the following summary of (1) Mr.
Rosenberg's testimony; (2) the jury instructions on the
issues generated by that testimony; and (3) the plaintiff s exception to those instructions:
Rosenberg testified in his own
behalf. The incident occurred January
5. 1953, at Monument and Caroline
Streets. His first knowledge of it was
six months later when he received a
letter from the Baltimore Transit Company dated July 13, 1953. The substance of his testimony is that he has no
recollection of the incident, and there
was no way for him, afterreceipt of said
letter, to ascertain whether or not his
automobile was atthe intersection mentioned at the particular time the incident
occurred. Rosen berg is a distri butor 0 f
coin operated machines with offices at
the time at 1101 Cathedral Street. He
lived a 3825 Copley Road, which is in
northwest Baltimore, near Cold Spring
Lane and Dolfield Avenue. His duties
are in the office and he does very little
traveling around the city. He uses his
car to drive to the office each day and
keeps it on a parking lot across from the
office. His wife has a car. He checked
his records and found nothing that would
cause him to be in that section on that
particular day. His employees have
their own cars which they use to make
service calls. Occasionally an employee may use Rosenberg's car and he
does not ask the reason for doing so.
He conferred with all his employees
and they could not remember about the
particular day.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the jury was instructed, in substance, that in order to render a verdict
against Rosenberg, it must find:
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(1) That an automobile crossed in front
of the trolley.
(2) That the automobile belonged to
Rosenberg.
(3) That Rosenberg or someone on
Rosenberg's business was driving the
automobile with his permission.
(4) That the driver of the automobile
was negligent.
The jury was further instructed
that the burden of proof was on the
plaintiffto establish to their satisfaction,
from all the evidence in the case, each
and all of the above propositions, and if
she failed to do so, or if their minds were
in a state of even balance as to anyone of
said propositions, their verdict should be
in favor of Rosenberg.
Plaintiff excepted to the charge.
The ground of the exception appears to
be that if the jury found propositions (1)
and (2) above, there was a presumption
that the automobile was being driven at
the time either by Rosenberg, or on his
business by his agent or servant, and the
burden of overcoming the presumption
was on Rosenberg.
My late friend Amos Meyers, Esq., a fine person
and a fine trial lawyer, was Miss Grier's counsel. The
Record Extract contains the exception he interposed on
Miss Grier's behalf, and the trial judge , s response to that
exception:
(Mr. Meyers) May I ask for a
clarification of the three or four items
wherein the court stated the obligation
that the plaintiff must show of Mr.
Rosenberg's negligence. I believe that in
that connection, your Honor, you should
tell the jury that the presumption is that
the operator ofthe vehicle is the owner's
agent and that then the burden is on the
defendant Rosenberg to show the contrary, if they believe that was his car at
the scene of the accident.

(The Court) No, I think in view
of the denial of ownership of the automobile alleged to have been involved,
even if there was a presumption, the
jury has to determine the matter from
all the evidence. A prima facie case of
agency probably results from proof of
ownership and the presumption would
be effective until evidence is offered
from which a contrary finding may be
made. When such evidence is offered,
then it is my understanding that the trier
of the facts has to determine the question from all the evidence. The burden
of proof never shifts.
In the Court ofAppeals, Amos prevailed on his
contention that Miss Grier was entitled to a new trial
because the Court held that the requested instruction
"should have been given." Grier, 213 Md. at 252, 131
A.2d at 739. The appellate court explained:
In a long line ofdecisions ofthis
Court, it has been held that there is a
rebuttable presumption that the driver
of an automobile is the agent, servant
and!or employee of the owner thereof.
.. [a]nd this includes a rebuttable presumption that the agent, servant and!or
employee was operating the automobile within the scope of his employment. (citations omitted)
This Court also has previously
approved the granting of instructions
of this nature, relating to negligence.
Indeed, if the instruction be not grant~
ed, how is the jury to know of the
presumption? No matter how clearly
the ownership ofa motor vehicle might
be established, without any information of, or instruction concerning, the
presumption, the jury might have great
reluctance in finding the driver of such
vehicle an agent or servant ofthe owner
acting within the scope of his employment.

Grier, 213 Md. at 252-253, 131 A.2d at 739.
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Subsequent cases have made clear that the kind
of presumption at issue in Grier shifts both the burden
of production and the burden of persuasion. See, e.g.,
Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215 at 221-22,210 A.2d 743
at 747-48 (1965). In Phillips, the evidence was sufficient to require that the jury decide the question of
whether the driver of an automobile involved in an
accident was about the owner's business on that occasion. The trial judge's instructions told the jurors, in
essence, to answer that question "yes" unless they were
persuaded to the contrary. This instruction was held to
be entirely correct. Phillips, 239 Md. at 222,210 A.2d
at 748.
There are situations in which the jury must be
instructed about an applicable presumption, e.g., the
criminal defendant's presumption of innocence, or the
presumption of correctness provided for by statute in
Workers' Compensation and Health Claims proceedings. Rule 5-301 makes no change to such instructions.
Under Grier and Phillips, when the presumption at issue
is the kind ofevidentiary presumption that shifts both the
burden ofproduction and the burden of persuasion (e.g.,
the presumption that the driver is the agent ofthe owner,
or the presumption that the grantee profited from a
confidential relationship with the grantor), the jurors are
instructed to find that the presumed fact is true unless
they are affirmatively persuaded that it is not true. If
Rule 5-301 now prohibits the kind of "burden shifting"
instruction that "should have been given" in Grier v.
Rosenberg, this Rule has made a most unfortunate
change in the area of jury instructions.

dence (in the absence of a statute or a reported opinion
of a Maryland appellate court holding that the results
are admissible) unless the proponent establishes that
the relevant scientific community is in general agreement that the scientific test at issue is capable of
producing an accurate result. See, e.g., Keen Corp. v.
Hall, 96 Md. App. 644 at 654-60, 626 A.2d 997 at
1002-05 (1993); United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor
o/Baltimore, 336 Md. 145 at 181-83,647 A.2d405 at
423-24 (1994). It took the Supreme Court eighteen
years to announce that the Frye test was abolished
when the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect. I
am certain that it will not be that long a period of time
before we learn whether the Frye-Reed test will be
abandoned. I hope that this test will stay with us.
Does our strict "evidence aliunde" rule still
apply when a "vicarious admission" is offered under
Rule 5-803(a)(4) or (5), and the foundational proof of
employment or concertive criminal conduct is in dispute? Under the federal rules: (1) the judge, not the
jury, decides whether the foundation is adequate; and
(2) in making that decision, the judge is not restricted
to evidence independent of the out-of-court declaration at issue. There are good arguments for retaining
the "evidence aliunde" rule, and good arguments for
following the federal practice.
I close with a reference to Rule 5-402, which
reminds us that "decisional law not inconsistent with
these rules" remains with us. By improving on the
decisional law, the Maryland Rules of Evidence have
made a sterling contribution to our jurisprudence.

OTHER UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Will our "catchall" hearsay exceptions--Rules
5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5)--admit any declaration
that is a "near miss" under one of the traditional hearsay
exceptions? I predict that the answer is "no."
In products liability cases, will Rule 5-407 exclude remedial measures taken prior to the date of the
plaintiff s injury, but subsequentto the date on which the
allegedly defective product entered the stream of commerce? That issue really should be resolved on a caseby-case basis.
Does the Frye-Reed test still apply to the expert
opinion, an essential component ofwhich is the result of
a scientific test? Under Frye-Reed, scientific test results--and opinions that could not be expressed without
reliance on such results--cannot be admitted into evi-
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